ced
submission and the truce taken to investigate the judicial decision or
the conciliatory compromise recommended will form a material
inducement to peace. It will cool the heat of passion, and will give
the men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.

The League of Peace will furnish a great opportunity for more definite
formulation of the principles of international law. The arbitral court
will amplify it and enrich it in their application of its general
principles to particular cases. They will create a body of Judge-made
law of the highest value. Then the existence of the league will lead
to ever-recurring congresses of the league, which, acting in a
quasi-legislative capacity, may widen the scope of international law
in a way that a court may not feel able or competent to do.

This is our plan. It is not so complicated--at least, in statement. In
its practical application difficulties now unforeseen may arise, but
we believe it offers a working hypothesis upon which a successful
arrangement can be made.

We are greeted first by the objection that no treaties can prevent
war. We are not called upon to deny this in order to justify or
vindicate our proposals as useful. We realize that nations sometimes
are utterly immoral in breaking treaties and shamelessly bold in
avowing their right to do so on the ground of necessity; but this is
not always the case. We cannot give up treaties because sometimes they
are broken any more than we can give up commercial contracts because
men sometimes dishonor themselves in breaking them. We decline to
assume that all nations always are dishonorable, or that a solemn
treaty obligation will not have some deterrent effect upon a nation
that has plighted its faith to prevent its breach. _When we add to
this the sanction of an agreement by a number of powerful nations to
enforce the obligation of the recalcitrant and faithless member, we
think we have a treaty that is much more than a "scrap of paper"--and
we base our faith in this on a common-sense view of human nature._

It is objected that we propose only to include the more powerful
nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we don't propose to have
the constitution of our court complicated by a demand for equal
representation of the many smaller nations. We believe that when we
have a league of larger powers the smaller powers will be glad to come
in and enjoy the protection that the league will afford against the