r Belgium.]
The worst contingencies that occurred to me, as
a Belgian, were the violation of a part of our
territory and the duty that might fall upon our
soldiers of barring the way to the
belligerents. In view of the vast area over
which a war between France and Germany would be
fought, dared we hope that Belgium would be
safe from any attack by the German army, from
any attempt to use her strategic routes for
offensive purposes? I could not bring myself to
believe that she would be so fortunate. But
between such tentatives and a thoroughgoing
invasion of my country, plotted a long time in
advance and carried out before the real
operations of the war had begun, there was a
wide gulf, a gulf that I never thought the
Imperial Government capable of leaping over
with a light heart, because of the European
complications which so reckless a disdain for
treaties would not fail to involve.
IV
Until the end of the crisis, the idea of a preventive war continually
recurred to my mind. Other heads of legations, however, while sharing
my anxieties on this point, did not agree with me as to the
premeditation of which I accused the Emperor and the military chiefs. I
was not content with putting my questions to the French Ambassador,
whose unerring judgment always carried great weight with me. I also
visited his Italian colleague, an astute diplomat, thoroughly versed in
German statecraft. He had always put me in mind of those dexterous
agents employed by the sixteenth-century Italian republics.
[Sidenote: Signor Bollati's views.]
[Sidenote: Germany and Austria confident.]
According to Signor Bollati, the German Government, agreeing in
principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity for chastising
Serbia, had not known beforehand the terms of the Austrian Note, the
violence of which was unprecedented in the language of Chancelleries.
Vienna, as well as Berlin, was convinced that Russia, in spite of the
official assurances that had recently passed between the Tsar and M.
Poincare regarding the complete readiness of the French and Russian
armies, was not in a position to enter on a European war, and that she
would not dare to embark upon so hazardous an adventure. Internal
troubles, revolutionary intrigues, incomplete armaments, inadequate
means of comm
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