ancy, our troops were brought back on to the
Grand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentrated
reinforcements--three army corps, at least--in the region of Luneville
and forced us to retire to the south.

This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after two
vigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other from
west to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort of
balance was established on this terrain between the Germans and
ourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will be
seen, modified to our advantage.

[Sidenote: Battle of the north.]

There remained the principal business, the battle of the
north--postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army.
On August 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the General
in Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive.
Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army,
reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, the
reserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which had
already been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liege, Namur, and
Louvain.

The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight army
corps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givet
and Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Our
object was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of the
enemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all available
forces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north.

[Sidenote: The offensive fails.]

On August 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. On
August 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious.

The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual and
collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy,
divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, a
premature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of our
troops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry and
artillery.

In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account the
difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the
advantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him.

[Sidenote: Enemy crosses the Sambre.]

In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, if