no less exactitude than among
the Stoics and some other philosophers, who established their doctrine as
much by reason as by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, who
found his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity.
54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the same
place. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their "Examine not,
only believe", they must tell me at least what are the things they wish me
to believe.' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells against those
who would say that God is good and just, and who yet would maintain that we
have no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute these
perfections to him. But one must not always demand what I call 'adequate
notions', involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptible
qualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such notions. Thus
we agreed that Mysteries should receive an explanation, but this
explanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to have some analogical
understanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to the
end that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of
meaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we would
wish, that is, to the extent of comprehension and to the _how_.
55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of
_common notions_ (in the third volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a
Provincial_, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not consult the idea of
goodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had declared himself
quite differently in his _Dictionary_. Of necessity there must be agreement
upon the meaning of _good_ and _bad_, amongst those who are in dispute[104]
over the question whether there is only one principle, altogether good, or
whether there are two, the one good and the other bad. We understand
something by union when we are told of the union of one body with another
or of a substance with its accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of the
place with the moving body, of the act with the potency; we also mean
something when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to make
thereof one single person. For albeit I do not hold that the soul changes
the laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul, and I
have introduced the Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, I
nevertheless admit a true union between the soul
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