who know
nothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospel
dissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where
that which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive
its due. The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without
the aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There is
also quoted (_Reply_, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz,
criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous
theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God
which are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passage
must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in
accordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it.
68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who are
more favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This great man
says positively (Part I of his _Principles_, art. 41) 'that we shall have
not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' (which
one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the
eternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our thought is finite, and
that the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only
known from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also has
willed it, is infinite. We have therefore quite enough intelligence to
recognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are in
God; but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can know
how they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined. Yet the
Power and the Knowledge of God must not prevent us from believing that we
have a free will; for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are
inwardly conscious, and which we know by experience to be within us, simply
because we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to be
incomprehensible in its nature.'
69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who rarely
think of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to me. Not
content with saying that, as for him, he sees no way of reconciling [112]
the two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all rational
creatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that there is
no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For such an
objectio
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