, to compel him to put it in good form, it cannot be said
that I answer nothing or that I answer nothing intelligible. For as it is
the doubtful premiss of the adversary that I deny, my denial will be [116]
as intelligible as his affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as to
explain myself by means of some distinction, it suffices that the terms I
employ have some meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in my
answer will be comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend all
that it involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also.)

75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that the
disputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be desirable,
but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point,
if the necessity arises.) 'and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, and
the signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything lies
in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or
immediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is done by means
of the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether the premisses of a
proof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the conclusion is
properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whether
some aphorism of the chapter _de oppositis_ or _de sophisticis elenchis_,
etc., has not been violated.' (It is enough, putting it briefly, to deny
some premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explained
some ambiguous term.) 'One comes off victorious either by showing that the
subject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been
agreed upon' (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing,
and then the defender wins the case), 'or by reducing the defender to
absurdity' (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well
proved). 'Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that
the conclusions of his thesis are "yes" and "no" at once, or by
constraining him to say only intelligible things in answer.' (This last
embarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance new
theses.) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon
obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.' (It is the aim of the opposer,
for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannot
here be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees that
one cannot