possessor of it into power.
The dominant member of society is the landowner and not the citizen.
In ancient society the "citizen" need own no land; in the modern
society of the feudal age, the "gentleman" could not be such without
owning land.

This opposition between the citizen, the burgher, and the landowner,
the baron, leads us to a conclusion of the utmost importance to the
whole study of city life during the middle ages. We note the universal
prevalence of the _forms_ characteristic of the feudal system, and
from this we conclude that its _principles_ were as universally
adopted. Now this is to a certain extent an error. There were certain
institutions which from the very nature of their origin and of the
principles on which they were based, must have been, at once in their
idea and in their structure, opposed to the fundamental principle of
feudalism. The Roman Church, for example, conformed itself to the
forms and customs of this system, but never lost its structural unity
and centralization, ideas founded on principles which stood in direct
opposition to those of feudalism. So it was, though perhaps in a less
degree, with the cities. Though adapting themselves in many ways to
feudal forms, here the idea of democracy was as strong in its
opposition to the dominant principle of feudalism, as ever was that of
centralization in the Church. The people, in their own conception at
least, stood out as an organic unity, and they considered their rights
and duties as matters which concerned them collectively, not
separately, as the commonwealth, not as individuals. Of course it was
long before any such opposition assumed a definite form and shape,
before even the people became conscious of its existence; but what I
wish to point out is, that it was there in fact from the beginning,
and must have formed a structural part of the development of city life
in the middle ages.

In outlining the course of the history of institutions, it is seldom
that we are so fortunate as to find definite landmarks by which we can
accurately mark the chronological course of their development. The
giving of definite dates for the progress of ideas is in most cases
both misleading and illusory, as, except in instances of violent
revolution, changes are apt to be gradual, rather than immediate and
arbitrary. But we can indicate the periods of progress by comparing
them with the contemporary political changes, and roughly designate
their eras