ty of
grasping invaders from the immense amount of produce deposited there,
than the city of New Orleans. It is known also that the seizure of no
part of our Union could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate
interests of so many States and of so many of our fellow-citizens,
comprising all that extensive territory and numerous population which
are connected with and dependent on the Mississippi, as the seizure of
that city. Strong works, well posted, were therefore deemed absolutely
necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which
communicate directly with or approach nearest to New Orleans, that the
town is assailable. It will be recollected that in the late war the
public solicitude was excited not so much by the danger which menaced it
in those directions as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be
made there, the main force, landing either in the bay of Mobile or other
waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town
in the rear of the army which had been collected there for its defense.
Full confidence was entertained that that gallant army, led by the
gallant and able chief who commanded it, would repel any attack to which
it might be exposed in front. But had such a force been thrown above the
town, and a position taken on the banks of the river, the disadvantage
to which our troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and
rear as they might have been, may easily be conceived. As their supplies
would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the city,
and, withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands
of the force below. In ascending the river to attack the force above,
the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have
been on such ground and at such time as the enemy preferred. These
considerations shew that defenses other than such as are immediately
connected with the city are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi
will be made only by a great power or a combination of several powers,
with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought
in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defenses around
New Orleans are well posted and of sufficient strength to repel any
attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a
land force, which must pass in the dir