ine above suggested between the Rigolets and the
bay of Mobile. It will be obvious that the nearer the fortification is
erected to the Rigolets with a view to this object, should it be on Cat
or Ship Island, for example, the wider would the passage be left open
between that work and the bay of Mobile for such an enterprise. The main
army, being drawn to New Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt
near the Rigolets or at any other point not distant from the city. It
is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would
make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object
from that point, and at the bay of Mobile should there not be works
there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong
works be erected there, such as were sufficient not only for their own
defense against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a
force connected with that which might be drawn from the neighboring
country, capable of cooperating with the force at the city, and which
would doubtless be ordered to those works in the event of war, it
would be dangerous for the invading force to land anywhere between the
Rigolets and the bay of Mobile and to pass toward the Mississippi above
the city, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear as to cut off its
retreat. These considerations show the great advantage of establishing
at the mouth of the bay of Mobile very strong works, such as would be
adequate to all the purposes suggested.

If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities
against the entry of large ships of war into our bays and rivers, they
would be of little use for the defense of New Orleans, since that city
can not be approached so near, either by the Mississippi or in any other
direction, by such vessels for them to make an attack on it. In the
Gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which had been acquired since
these works were decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river into
which large ships of war can enter. As a defense, therefore, against an
attack from such vessels extensive works would be altogether unnecessary
either at Mobile Point or at Dauphine Island, since sloops of war only
can navigate the deepest channel. But it is not for that purpose
alone that these works are intended. It is to provide also against a
formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to
shake the foundation of our system. Should s