stic hysteria, Swedish politicians
have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.

But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint
administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they
like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
sort of "_confusion_"; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents
of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedis