s?

In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he
might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws
will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that
they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP,
and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
negotiations.

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communique? It is
evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
the Communique must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
authority.

On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
foreign administration "into her own hands_." The great fear of such a
contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by
the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
loyalty wit