ers--above all,
the financial powers--of the Irish State, are the two points of cardinal
importance. As I have shown, they are inseparably connected, and form,
in reality, one great question.

I have endeavoured to prove that from whatever angle we approach that
central issue, whether we argue from representation to powers, or from
powers to representation, and whether the particular powers we argue
from be financial, legislative, or executive; whether we place Irish,
British, or Imperial interests in the forefront of our exposition--we
are led irresistibly to the colonial solution--that is, to the cessation
of Irish representation at Westminster, coupled with a concession to
Ireland of the full legislative and executive authority appropriate to
that measure of independence, and, above all, with fiscal autonomy.

All the other provisions of the Bill are secondary. They may be divided
into two categories, which necessarily overlap:

1. Provisions concerning Ireland only.

2. Provisions defining the Imperial authority over Ireland.

The structure of the Irish Legislature, the position of the Irish
Judiciary, the safeguards for minorities, the provision made for
existing servants of the State, the statutory arrangements, if any, for
the future reorganization of the Irish Police--these and other questions
are of great intrinsic importance, and need the most careful discussion;
but they are altogether subordinate to those we have already considered.
If it be over-sanguine to hope, in Ireland's interest, that they will be
discussed in a calm and dispassionate way, we can at least demand that
those provisions belonging to the second category, which present no
appreciable difficulty, will not excite bitter and barren disputes like
those of 1893.

It is not within the scope of this volume to discuss exhaustively the
secondary provisions of the Bill, or to suggest the exact statutory form
which those provisions, major or minor, should take. In this chapter I
shall deal briefly with matters which I have hitherto left aside, and
incidentally give more precision to the points upon which I have already
suggested a conclusion, in both cases indicating, so far as possible,
the most useful precedents and parallels from other Constitutions. The
result will be the rough sketch of a Home Rule Bill.

PREAMBLE.

"Whereas it is expedient that _without impairing or restricting the
supreme authority of Parliament_, an Irish Legislatu