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the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all
the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so
that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would
have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so
very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,
to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a
less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt
that he would have succeeded.
Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days
in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.
Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to
cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and
move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running
from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that
McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the
latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the
army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran
divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to
have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not
back.
Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the
winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this
with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so
as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say
they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to
no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the
part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore
brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of
Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were
abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.
Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was
useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it
by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in
the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which
a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been
dammed so that the va
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