FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   370   371   372   373   374   375   376   377   378   379   380   381   382   383   384   385   386   387   388   389   390   391   392   393   394  
395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   >>   >|  
ng the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded. Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the va
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   370   371   372   373   374   375   376   377   378   379   380   381   382   383   384   385   386   387   388   389   390   391   392   393   394  
395   396   397   398   399   400   401   402   403   404   405   406   407   408   409   410   411   412   413   414   415   416   417   418   419   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Dalton

 

Sherman

 
McPherson
 

strongly

 

armies

 

Chattanooga

 
express
 
furlough
 

divisions

 

Johnston


troops
 
winter
 
Thomas
 

position

 

stream

 

Atlanta

 
intrenched
 

railroad

 

purpose

 

absorb


continued

 

department

 

returned

 

prepared

 

Mississippi

 

operate

 

forces

 

Besides

 

pledge

 

dammed


campaign

 

useless

 

Confederate

 

fortified

 

promptly

 
National
 
impracticable
 

mountain

 

approaches

 

regular


attempt
 
assault
 

abreast

 

changed

 

narrowing

 

brought

 
coming
 

farthest

 
Schofield
 

succeeded