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d Washington, of the same classes, of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it. To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Richmond, and then to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO MRS. LINCOLN. WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 20, 1863. MRS. A. LINCOLN, New York: I neither see nor hear anything of sickness here now, though there may be much without my knowing it. I wish you to stay or come just as is most agreeable to yourself. A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO MRS. LINCOLN. WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C, September 21, 1863. MRS. A. LINCOLN. Fifth Avenue Hotel. New York: The air is so clear and cool and apparently healthy that I would be glad for you to come. Nothing very particular, but I would be glad to see you and Tad. A. LINCOLN. TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. EXECUTI
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