, D. C., September 19.1863.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON.

MY DEAR SIR:--Herewith I send you a paper, substantially the same as the
one drawn up by yourself and mentioned in your despatch, but slightly
changed in two particulars: First, yours was so drawn as that I authorized
you to carry into effect the fourth section, etc., whereas I so modify
it as to authorize you to so act as to require the United States to carry
into effect that section.

Secondly, you had a clause committing me in some sort to the State
constitution of Tennessee, which I feared might embarrass you in making a
new constitution, if you desire; so I dropped that clause.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

[Inclosure.]

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C.,

September 19, 1863.

HON. ANDREW JOHNSON, Military Governor of Tennessee:

In addition to the matters contained in the orders and instructions given
you by the Secretary of War, you are hereby authorized to exercise such
powers as may be necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of
Tennessee to present such a republican form of State government as will
entitle the State to the guaranty of the United States therefor, and to
be protected under such State government by the United States against
invasion and domestic violence, all according to the fourth Section of the
fourth article of the Constitution of the United States.

A. LINCOLN

MILITARY STRATEGY

TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON D.C. September 19, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK:

By General Meade's despatch to you of yesterday it appears that he desires
your views and those of the government as to whether he shall advance upon
the enemy. I am not prepared to order, or even advise, an advance in this
case, wherein I know so little of particulars, and wherein he, in the
field, thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small.

And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in
another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river,
substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own
capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's
infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per
cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far
as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000.

General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him an