st simultaneously occurred the remaining two surprising
events. Fremont withdrew from his candidacy in order to do his "part
toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate." And Lincoln
asked for the resignation of a member of his Cabinet, Postmaster-General
Montgomery Blair, who was the especial enemy of the Vindictives.
The official biographers of Lincoln* keep these three events separate.
They hold that Blair's removal was wholly Lincoln's idea, and that from
chivalrous reasons he would not abandon his friend as long as he seemed
to be losing the game. The historian Rhodes writes confidently of a
bargain with Fremont, holding that Blair was removed to terminate a
quarrel with Fremont which dated back even to his own removal in 1861.
A possible third theory turns upon Chase, whose hostility to Blair was
quite equal to that of the illbalanced Fremont. It had been stimulated
the previous winter by a fierce arraignment of Chase made by Blair's
brother in Congress, in which Chase was bluntly accused of fraud and
of making money, or allowing his friends to make money, through illicit
trade in cotton. And Chase was a man of might among the Vindictives. The
intrigue, however, never comes to the foreground in history, but lurks
in the background thick with shadows. Once or twice among those
shadows we seem to catch a glimpse of the figure of Thurlow Weed, the
master-politician of the time. Taking one thing with another, we may
risk the guess that somehow the two radical groups which were both
relentless against Blair were led to pool their issues, and that Blair's
removal was the price Lincoln paid not to one faction of radicals but to
the whole unmerciful crowd.
*His private secretaries, John G. Nicolay and John Hay.
Whatever complex of purposes lay back of the triple coincidence, the
latter part of September saw a general reunion of the factions within
the Union Party, followed by a swift recovery of strength. When the
election came, Lincoln received an electoral vote of 212 against 21, and
a popular vote of 2,330,552 against 1,835,985.
The inevitable question arises as to what was the real cause of this
success. It is safe to say that the political campaign contained some
adroit strategy; that Sherman was without doubt an enormous factor; that
the Democrats made numerous blunders; and that the secret societies had
an effect other than they intended. However, the real clue seems to be
found in one se
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