ccessful attempts made in 1805, was the
West Indies. There was the most powerful foreign arsenal, Martinique,
left in the hands of France, and there the greatest single interest of
the wide-spread commerce upon which depended the life of Great
Britain. The latter, therefore, was specially sensitive to anything
threatening the safety of the West India Islands. "I should think the
West Indies the more likely place for the French to succeed in," wrote
Nelson to Ball, on the 6th of September, 1804. "Suppose the Toulon
fleet escapes, and gets out of the Straits, I rather think I should
bend my course to the westward; for if they carry 7,000 men--with what
they have at Martinico and Guadaloupe--St. Lucia, Grenada, St.
Vincent, Antigua, and St. Kitts would fall, and, in that case, England
would be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves." This
is a noteworthy passage, for it shows great sagacity of prediction,
and, in announcing beforehand his resolve,--of which this is not the
sole previous mention,--it dispels entirely the idea that he was
decoyed to the West Indies. It explains, also, the remarkable outburst
of gratitude that hailed him on his return from a chase which had
been wholly unsuccessful as regards his own chief object--the
annihilation of the French fleet. He had failed to find it, but he had
driven the enemy out of the West Indies before they could do any
serious injury to the vital interests of the country. A man cannot be
said to be decoyed, because, in pursuance of a judgment deliberately
formed beforehand, he does the thing which the moment demands; unless
it can be shown that he has thereby uncovered greater interests. This
Nelson did not do. He saved the West Indies, and returned in time to
protect Great Britain and Ireland from invasion.
It is through the perplexities of this momentous period that we have
now to follow him, and we shall do so to most advantage by taking as
our clue his own avowed primary motive of action, the finding and
destroying of the French fleet. A man dealing with Napoleon was bound
to meet perplexities innumerable, to thread a winding and devious
track, branching out often into false trails that led nowhere, and
confused by cross-lights which glittered only to mislead. In such a
case, as in the doubtful paths of common life, the only sure guide to
a man's feet is principle; and Nelson's principle was the destruction
of the French fleet. No other interest, his own l
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