On the 26th Nelson communicated with Cagliari, and learned that no
landing had been attempted in Sardinia. The same day the frigate
"Phoebe" rejoined, with information that a French eighty-gun ship had
anchored in Ajaccio on the evening of the 19th, dismasted and
crippled. Putting these facts together, and in connection with his own
movements, he inferred conclusively that either the French had gone
back to Toulon in consequence of injuries, or that they had given him
the slip, had got round Sicily, and proceeded to the eastward. The
latter was improbable, because the westerly gales, as he had noted,
could scarcely have allowed them to weather Maritimo[86]; it was not,
however, impossible. A return to Toulon was, antecedently, equally
improbable, although it proved to be the alternative adopted by
Villeneuve. "Although I knew one of the French ships was crippled,
yet I considered the character of Bonaparte; and that the orders given
by him, on the banks of the Seine, would not take into consideration
winds or weather; nor indeed could the accident of three or four ships
alter, _in my opinion_,[87] a destination of importance: therefore
such an accident did not weigh in my mind, and I went first to the
Morea and then to Egypt." This quotation is especially interesting, as
it proves how closely Nelson scanned every known element in a problem,
even to the temperament of his opponent; and it also shows the
substantial agreement in judgment between him and Napoleon. The
latter, Thiers writes, "was sensibly displeased on hearing of this
resultless sortie. 'What is to be done,' he said, 'with admirals who
allow their spirits to sink, and determine to hasten home at the first
damage they receive? All the captains ought to have had sealed orders
to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired
_en route_. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of
wind, were every-day occurrences. But the great evil of our Navy is,
that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command.'"

Still without definite tidings, compelled to act upon his own
inferences--for merely doing nothing was action under such
circumstances--Nelson reasoned that, if the French had returned, he
could not overtake them, and if they had gone east, he had no time to
lose before following. He fell back therefore from his windward
position to the Straits of Messina, through which the whole squadron
beat on the 31st of Ja