tingents, the one from Rochefort was small; and, as a factor,
although important, it was not essential. Its failure might weaken or
impede the progress of the general movement, without entirely
destroying it; but it was of necessity that the Toulon and Brest
divisions both should fulfil their missions, accurately and on time,
if the great combination, of which they were parts, was to advance to
a triumphant conclusion. This emphasized to the British the
importance, which Nelson always so keenly felt, of meeting the enemy
immediately after they left port. Once away, and their destination in
doubt, the chances in favor of any scheme were multiplied. In their
greatest and final effort, Cornwallis, off Brest, was fortunate, in
that the plans of the Emperor first, and afterwards unusual weather
conditions, retained the French fleet there in harbor; a result to
which the material efficiency of his own ships, and their nearness to
their base, much contributed.

Upon Nelson, with his crazy ships, on the other hand, fell the burden
of counteracting a successful evasion of the Toulon fleet, of foiling,
by sagacious and untiring pursuit, through immense and protracted
discouragements, the efforts of the one division which had been
committed to his watch. Although it became much superior to his own
force, he drove it out of the position in the West Indies first
appointed for the meeting, followed it back to Europe, arrived before
it, and then, finding it had gone to Ferrol, carried his squadron,
without orders, counselled simply by his own genius, to the aid of
Cornwallis; by which act the British navy, to the number of
thirty-five ships-of-the-line, was massed in a central position,
separating the two enemy's bodies, and able to act decisively against
a foe approaching from either direction. Thus a second time he
prevented the enemy from forming a junction, unless they fought for
it--an alternative Napoleon wished to avoid. To him fell all the
strain of uncertainty, all the doubtful and complicated mental effort,
all the active strategic movement, of the campaign, and to him
consequently has been attributed justly the greater meed of glory;
though care must be taken not to ignore or undervalue the well-played
parts of other admirals, which were essential to the success of the
great defensive campaign comprehended under the name Trafalgar.

The point selected by the Emperor for the meeting of his naval
divisions, in both the unsu