e throughout a period
when the departure of a single ship would have ruined all, and
probably caused its own destruction.

This incident of refusing to see the signal has become as hackneyed as
a popular ballad, and in its superficial aspect, showing Nelson as the
mere fighting man, who, like a plucky dog, could not be dragged off
his antagonist, might well now have been dismissed with the shortest
and most summary mention. Of late years doubt has been cast over the
reality of Nelson's disobedience, for the reason that Otway, whose
mission has already been noted, carried a verbal message that the
order was to be understood as permissive, leaving Nelson the liberty
to obey or not. From Otway's biography, however, it appears that the
signal was hoisted before he reached the "Elephant." Parker's
Secretary, Mr. Scott, has also stated distinctly, that "it was
arranged between the admirals, that, should it appear the ships which
were engaged were suffering too severely, the signal for retreat would
be made, to give Lord Nelson the option of retiring, if he thought
fit."[34]

On the other hand, without affirming positively, it should be said
that Nelson's own impressions do not seem to have agreed with Scott's.
Not only did he say, some hours after the fight, "Well, I have fought
contrary to orders, and I shall perhaps be hanged; never mind, let
them,"--which might pass as a continuation of the quarter-deck drama,
if such it was,--but his account of the matter to Lord Minto is not
consistent with any clear understanding, on his part, that he had such
liberty of action. Nearly a year later, in March, 1802, Minto writes:
"Lord Nelson explained to me a little, on Saturday last, the sort of
blame which had been imputed to Sir Hyde Parker for Copenhagen; in the
first place, for not commanding the attack in person, and in the next
place for making signals to recall the fleet during the action; and
everything would have been lost if these signals had been obeyed." If
Nelson understood that the signal was to be construed as permissive
only, it was extremely ungenerous, and most unlike Nelson, to have
withheld an explanation which extenuated, if it did not excuse, one of
the most dangerous and ill-judged orders that ever was conveyed by
flags; nor is it probable that Parker, if the understanding had been
explicit, would not have insisted with the Admiralty upon the fact,
when he was smarting under the general censure, which had led t