the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; "and," now
that the right wing of the defence is destroyed, "all is at stake."
The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters,
laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and in
further reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The artillery officers
who were to supervise the bombardment satisfied themselves that, if
the floating defences south of the Trekroner were destroyed, the
bomb-vessels could be placed in such a position as to shell the city,
without being themselves exposed to undue peril.

Parker gave Nelson twelve ships-of-the-line, two more than he had
asked; a judicious addition, for the main part of the fighting was to
fall to him, and the difficulties of pilotage might, and actually did,
deprive him of several ships. Moreover, while it was proposed that the
vessels remaining with Parker should approach and engage the northern
defences, yet the time of attack depended upon a fair wind for Nelson;
and as that would necessarily be foul for the other body, the
diversion made by it might be, and proved to be, ineffective. Sound
judgment dictated giving Nelson all that could be spared.

On the afternoon of the 31st another council was held, in which
Nelson's plan was finally ratified; he again volunteered his
services, which were accepted and his force detailed. As usual, the
council was prolific in suggestions of danger. Stewart, who seems to
have been present, writes: "During this Council of War, the energy of
Lord Nelson's character was remarked: certain difficulties had been
started by some of the members, relative to each of the three Powers
we should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those
seas. The number of the Russians was, in particular, represented as
formidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everything
that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remark
was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous the
better;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much the
better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, depend
on it.' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the
total want of tactique among the Northern fleets; and to his
intention, whenever he should bring either the Swedes or Russians to
action, of attacking the head of their line, and confusing their
movements as much as possible. He used to say, 'Cl