s a great deal of Quixotism in this business;
there is no getting any positive information of their strength."
Nelson's general plan of attack is set forth in main outlines in the
letter already given, but it is desirable to give a somewhat more
detailed description. It will be seen, by the annexed chart, that
there are before Copenhagen two channels by which the city can be
passed. Between the two lies a shoal, called the Middle Ground. The
inner, known as the King's Channel, lay under the guns of the defences
which had been hurriedly improvised for the present emergency. These
consisted of a line of hulks, mostly mastless, ranged along the inner
side of the King's Channel, close to the flats which bordered it,
flanked at the northern end by the permanent work, called the
Trekroner[29] Battery. Westward of the latter lay, across the mouth of
the harbor proper, two more hulks, and a small squadron consisting of
two ships-of-the-line and a frigate, masted, and in commission. This
division was not seriously engaged, and, as a factor in the battle,
may be disregarded.
The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger. To
attack there, Nelson called "taking the bull by the horns." The
southern wing was much more exposed. Nor was this all. An advance from
the north must be made with a northerly wind. If unsuccessful, or
even, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could not
return to the north, where the fleet was. On the other hand, attack
from the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after an
action, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threaded
safely the difficult navigation. In any event there was risk, but none
knew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made. To the
considerations above given he added that, when south of the city, the
British would be interposed between the other Baltic navies and
Denmark. The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements,
unless the English squadron were first defeated. He therefore proposed
that ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offered
himself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel,
gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principal
attack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstration
against the northern end. The sagacity of this scheme is best attested
from the enemy himself. "We have been deceived in the plan of attack,"
wrote
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