ill
briefly, and then introduced a series of resolutions combating the proposed
measure on economical principles and on those of justice, and especially
assailing the readiness to abandon the rightful powers of Congress and
yield them up to any form of resistance. Before, however, he could speak in
support of his resolutions, the "Force Bill" came up, and Mr. Calhoun made
his celebrated argument in support of nullification. This Mr. Webster was
obliged to answer, and he replied with the great speech known in his works
as "The Constitution not a compact between sovereign States." In a general
way the same criticism is applicable to this debate as to that with Hayne,
but there were some important differences. Mr. Calhoun's argument was
superior to that of his follower. It was dry and hard, but it was a
splendid specimen of close and ingenious reasoning, and, as was to be
expected, the originator and master surpassed the imitator and pupil. Mr.
Webster's speech, on the other hand, in respect to eloquence, was decidedly
inferior to the masterpiece of 1830. Mr. Curtis says, "Perhaps there is no
speech ever made by Mr. Webster that is so close in its reasoning, so
compact, and so powerful." To the first two qualities we can readily
assent, but that it was equally powerful may be doubted. So long as Mr.
Webster confined himself to defending the Constitution as it actually was
and as what it had come to mean in point of fact, he was invincible. Just
in proportion as he left this ground and attempted to argue on historical
premises that it was a fundamental law, he weakened his position, for the
historical facts were against him. In the reply to Hayne he touched but
slightly on the historical, legal, and theoretical aspects of the case, and
he was overwhelming. In the reply to Calhoun he devoted his strength
chiefly to these topics, and, meeting his keen antagonist on the latter's
own chosen ground, he put himself at a disadvantage. In the actual present
and in the steady course of development, the facts were wholly with Mr.
Webster. Whatever the people of the United States understood the
Constitution to mean in 1789, there can be no question that a majority in
1833 regarded it as a fundamental law, and not as a compact--an opinion
which has now become universal. But it was quite another thing to argue
that what the Constitution had come to mean was what it meant when it was
adopted. The identity of meaning at these two periods was