FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   644   645   646   647   648   649   650   651   652   653   654   655   656   657   658   659   660   661   662   663   664   665   666   667   668  
669   670   671   672   673   674   675   676   677   678   679   680   681   682   683   684   685   686   687   688   689   690   691   692   693   >>   >|  
zed by the Constitution--and in the establishment of slavery throughout its vast limits, actually and substantially under the auspices of that instrument which declares its only objects to be--"to form a more perfect union, establish JUSTICE, insure DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of LIBERTY to ourselves and our posterity."[A] [Footnote A: It may be replied, The colored people were held as _property_ by the laws of Louisiana previously to the cession, and that Congress had no right to divest the newly acquired citizens of their property. This statement is evasive. It does not include, nor touch the question, which is this:--Had Congress, or the treaty-making power, a right to recognise, and, by recognising, to establish, in a territory that had no claim of privilege, on the ground of being part of one of the "Original States," a condition of things that it could not establish _directly_, because there was no grant in the constitution of power, direct or incidental, to do so--and because, _to do so_, was in downright oppugnancy to the principles of the Constitution itself? The question may be easily answered by stating the following case:--Suppose a law had existed in Louisiana, previous to the cession, by which the children--male and female--of all such parents as were not owners of real estate of the yearly value of $500, had been--no matter how long--held in slavery by their more wealthy land-holding neighbors:--would Congress, under the Constitution, have a right (by recognising) to establish, for ever, such a relation as one white person, under such a law, might hold to another? Surely not. And yet no substantial difference between the two cases can be pointed out.] In this case, the violation of the Constitution was suffered to pass with but little opposition, except from Massachusetts, because we were content to receive in exchange, multiplied commercial benefits and enlarged territorial limits. The next stride that slavery made over the Constitution was in the admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union. _She_ could claim no favor as part of an "Original State." At this point, it might have been supposed, the friends of Freedom and of the Constitution according to its original intent, would have made a stand. But no: with the exception of Massachusetts, they hesitated and were persuaded to acquiesce, because the country was j
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   644   645   646   647   648   649   650   651   652   653   654   655   656   657   658   659   660   661   662   663   664   665   666   667   668  
669   670   671   672   673   674   675   676   677   678   679   680   681   682   683   684   685   686   687   688   689   690   691   692   693   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
Constitution
 

establish

 

Congress

 

slavery

 

Louisiana

 

question

 
Massachusetts
 

cession

 

property

 

recognising


Original
 

limits

 

person

 
relation
 
Surely
 
substantial
 

difference

 
intent
 

exception

 

original


neighbors

 

country

 

matter

 

yearly

 

estate

 
acquiesce
 

hesitated

 
holding
 

persuaded

 

wealthy


Freedom

 

receive

 

exchange

 

content

 
multiplied
 

enlarged

 
territorial
 

benefits

 

admission

 

commercial


owners

 

violation

 

friends

 
pointed
 

stride

 
supposed
 
suffered
 

opposition

 
oppugnancy
 
Footnote