self, whether it would be for his ultimate happiness to begin,
according to his ability, to misgovern. If he could be sure of being
as lucky as some that are dead and gone, there might be difficulty in
finding him an answer. But he is NOT sure; and never can be, till he
is dead. He does not know that he is not close upon the moment when
misgovernment such as he is tempted to contemplate, will be made a
terrible example of. It is not fair to pick out the instance of the
thief that has died unhanged. The question is, whether thieving is at
this moment an advisable trade to begin with all the possibilities of
hanging not got over? This is the spirit of Mr Bentham's principle; and
if there is anything opposed to it in any former statement, it may be
corrected by the present."

We hope that we have now at last got to the real "magnificent
principle,"--to the principle which is really to make "the bones of the
sages and patriots stir." What effect it may produce on the bones of
the dead we shall not pretend to decide; but we are sure that it will do
very little for the happiness of the living.

In the first place, nothing is more certain than this, that the
Utilitarian theory of government, as developed in Mr Mill's Essay and
in all the other works on the subject which have been put forth by the
sect, rests on those two principles,--that men follow their interest,
and that the interest of individuals may be, and in fact perpetually
is, opposed to the interest of society. Unless these two principles be
granted, Mr Mill's Essay does not contain one sound sentence. All his
arguments against monarchy and aristocracy, all his arguments in favour
of democracy, nay, the very argument by which he shows that there is
any necessity for having government at all, must be rejected as utterly
worthless.

This is so palpable that even the Westminster Reviewer, though not the
most clear-sighted of men, could not help seeing it. Accordingly, he
attempts to guard himself against the objection, after the manner of
such reasoners, by committing two blunders instead of one. "All this,"
says he, "only shows that the members of a government would do well if
they were all-wise," and he proceeds to tell us that, as rulers are not
all-wise, they will invariably act against this principle wherever they
can, so that the democratical checks will still be necessary to produce
good government.

No form which human folly takes is so richly and exquisite