dispute. I will first give the words of the Reviewer, who, when
speaking of my general argument regarding the magnitude of the evils,
moral and physical, implied in the theory I oppose, sums up his ideas
thus:--'Mr Sadler says, that it is not a light or transient evil, but a
great and permanent evil. What then? The question of the origin of evil
is a question of aye or no,--not a question of MORE or LESS.' But what
says Paley? His express rule is this, that 'when we cannot resolve all
appearances into benevolence of design, we make the FEW give place to
the MANY, the LITTLE to the GREAT; that we take our judgment from a
large and decided preponderancy.' Now in weighing these two authorities,
directly at issue on this point, I think there will be little trouble
in determining which we shall make 'to give place;' or, if we 'look to
a large and decided preponderancy' of either talent, learning, or
benevolence, from whom we shall 'take our judgment.' The effrontery, or,
to speak more charitably, the ignorance of a reference to Paley on this
subject, and in this instance, is really marvellous."

Now, does not Mr Sadler see that the very words which he quotes from
Paley contain in themselves a refutation of his whole argument? Paley
says, indeed, as every man in his senses would say, that in a certain
case, which he has specified, the more and the less come into question.
But in what case? "When we CANNOT resolve all appearances into the
benevolence of design." It is better that there should be a little
evil than a great deal of evil. This is self-evident. But it is also
self-evident, that no evil is better than a little evil. Why, then, is
there any evil? It is a mystery which we cannot solve. It is a mystery
which Paley, by the very words which Mr Sadler has quoted, acknowledges
himself unable to solve; and it is because he cannot solve that mystery
that he proceeds to take into consideration the more and the less.
Believing in the divine goodness, we must necessarily believe that the
evils which exist are necessary to avert greater evils. But what those
greater evils are, we do not know. How the happiness of any part of the
sentient creation would be in any respect diminished if, for example,
children cut their teeth without pain, we cannot understand. The case
is exactly the same with the principle of Mr Malthus. If superfecundity
exists, it exists, no doubt, because it is a less evil than some other
evil which otherwise w