wledge, here
opposes them, and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there
be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a
knowledge be of any use?

The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the two senses of
the word (Greek), or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance,
which is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own
business, the doing of good actions, the dialogue passes onto the
intellectual conception of (Greek), which is declared also to be the
science of self-knowledge, or of the knowledge of what we know and do
not know, or of the knowledge of good and evil. The dialogue represents
a stage in the history of philosophy in which knowledge and action were
not yet distinguished. Hence the confusion between them, and the easy
transition from one to the other. The definitions which are offered are
all rejected, but it is to be observed that they all tend to throw a
light on the nature of temperance, and that, unlike the distinction of
Critias between (Greek), none of them are merely verbal quibbles, it is
implied that this question, although it has not yet received a solution
in theory, has been already answered by Charmides himself, who has
learned to practise the virtue of self-knowledge which philosophers are
vainly trying to define in words. In a similar spirit we might say to a
young man who is disturbed by theological difficulties, 'Do not trouble
yourself about such matters, but only lead a good life;' and yet
in either case it is not to be denied that right ideas of truth may
contribute greatly to the improvement of character.

The reasons why the Charmides, Lysis, Laches have been placed together
and first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness
and simplicity. The Charmides and the Lysis, if not the Laches, are of
the same 'quality' as the Phaedrus and Symposium: and it is probable,
though far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater
one. (ii) Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to
the class called dialogues of search (Greek), which have no conclusion.
(iii) The absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as
the doctrine of recollection and of the Platonic ideas; the questions,
whether virtue can be taught; whether the virtues are one or many.
(iv) They have a want of depth, when compared with the dialogues of
the middle and later period; and a youthful beauty an