hich, having no
subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences?
Yes, that is what is affirmed.
But how strange is this, if it be indeed true: we must not however as
yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather
consider the matter.
You are quite right.
Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of
something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?
Yes.
Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than
something else? (Socrates is intending to show that science differs from
the object of science, as any other relative differs from the object
of relation. But where there is comparison--greater, less, heavier,
lighter, and the like--a relation to self as well as to other things
involves an absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case
of the senses, is hardly conceivable. The use of the genitive after the
comparative in Greek, (Greek), creates an unavoidable obscurity in the
translation.)
Yes.
Which is less, if the other is conceived to be greater?
To be sure.
And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and
greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in
comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have
the property of being greater and also less than itself?
That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.
Or if there be a double which is double of itself and of other doubles,
these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?
That is true.
And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which
is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be
younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative
to self will retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for
example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?
Yes.
Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no
other way of hearing.
Certainly.
And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a
colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.
No.
Do you remark, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been
recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and
in other cases hardly credible--inadmissible, for example, in the case
of magnitudes, numbers, and the like?
Very true.
But in the case of
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