f the soul, not the quietest,
as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is
thought worthy of praise, but he who does so most easily and quickly?
Quite true, he said.
And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are
clearly better than slowness and quietness?
Clearly they are.
Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life
quiet,--certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is
supposed to be the good. And of two things, one is true,--either never,
or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than
the quick and energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions,
there are as many quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant
this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly
and energetically, either in walking or talking or in anything else;
nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that
temperance is admitted by us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick
have been shown to be as good as the quiet.
I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right.
Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within;
consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature
of that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave
youth, tell me--What is temperance?
After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think,
he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or
modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.
Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is
noble?
Yes, certainly, he said.
And the temperate are also good?
Yes.
And can that be good which does not make men good?
Certainly not.
And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?
That is my opinion.
Well, I said; but surely you would agree with Homer when he says,
'Modesty is not good for a needy man'?
Yes, he said; I agree.
Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good?
Clearly.
But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is
always good?
That appears to me to be as you say.
And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty--if temperance is
a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good?
All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true; but I should like to know
what you think about another definition
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