he old Liberal-Unionist
party, and imposing his own fiscal policy upon the Liberal-Unionist
caucus, was now complete.

During the spring and summer of 1905 Mr Chamberlain's more active
supporters were in favour of forcing a dissolution by leaving the
government in a minority, but he himself preferred to leave matters to
take their course, so long as the prime minister was content to be
publicly identified with the policy of eventually fighting on tariff
reform lines. Speaking at the Albert Hall in July Mr Chamberlain pushed
somewhat further than before his "embrace" of Mr Balfour; and in the
autumn, when foreign affairs no longer dominated the attention of the
government, the crisis rapidly came to a head. In reply to Mr Balfour's
appeal for the sinking of differences (Newcastle, November 14), Mr
Chamberlain insisted at Bristol (November 21) on the adoption of his
fiscal policy; and Mr Balfour resigned on December 4. on the ground that
he no longer retained the confidence of the party. At the crushing
Unionist defeat in the general election which followed in January 1906,
Mr Chamberlain was triumphantly returned for West Birmingham, and all
the divisions of Birmingham returned Chamberlainite members. Amid the
wreck of the party--Mr Balfour and several of his colleagues themselves
losing their seats--he had the consolation of knowing that the tariff
reformers won the only conspicuous successes of the election. But he had
no desire to set himself up as leader in Mr Balfour's place, and after
private negotiations with the ex-prime minister, a common platform was
arranged between them, on which Mr Balfour, for whom a seat was found in
the City of London, should continue to lead the remnant of the party.
The formula was given in a letter from Mr Balfour of February 14th (see
BALFOUR, A.J.) which admitted the necessity of making fiscal reform the
first plank in the Unionist platform, and accepted a general tariff on
manufactured goods and a small duty on foreign corn as "not in principle
objectionable."

It may be left to future historians to attempt a considered judgment on
the English tariff reform movement, and on Mr Chamberlain's
responsibility for the Unionist _debacle_ of 1906. But while his enemies
taunted him with having twice wrecked his party--first the Radical party
under Mr Gladstone, and secondly the Unionist party under Mr Balfour--no
well-informed critic doubted his sincerity, or failed to recognize that
in l