that this flank march cannot be
attributed to any one man, that no one ever foresaw it, and that in
reality, like the retreat from Fili, it did not suggest itself to anyone
in its entirety, but resulted--moment by moment, step by step, event by
event--from an endless number of most diverse circumstances and was only
seen in its entirety when it had been accomplished and belonged to the
past.

At the council at Fili the prevailing thought in the minds of the
Russian commanders was the one naturally suggesting itself, namely, a
direct retreat by the Nizhni road. In proof of this there is the fact
that the majority of the council voted for such a retreat, and above
all there is the well-known conversation after the council, between the
commander in chief and Lanskoy, who was in charge of the commissariat
department. Lanskoy informed the commander in chief that the army
supplies were for the most part stored along the Oka in the Tula and
Ryazan provinces, and that if they retreated on Nizhni the army would
be separated from its supplies by the broad river Oka, which cannot be
crossed early in winter. This was the first indication of the necessity
of deviating from what had previously seemed the most natural course--a
direct retreat on Nizhni-Novgorod. The army turned more to the south,
along the Ryazan road and nearer to its supplies. Subsequently the
inactivity of the French (who even lost sight of the Russian army),
concern for the safety of the arsenal at Tula, and especially the
advantages of drawing nearer to its supplies caused the army to turn
still further south to the Tula road. Having crossed over, by a forced
march, to the Tula road beyond the Pakhra, the Russian commanders
intended to remain at Podolsk and had no thought of the Tarutino
position; but innumerable circumstances and the reappearance of French
troops who had for a time lost touch with the Russians, and projects
of giving battle, and above all the abundance of provisions in Kaluga
province, obliged our army to turn still more to the south and to cross
from the Tula to the Kaluga road and go to Tarutino, which was between
the roads along which those supplies lay. Just as it is impossible to
say when it was decided to abandon Moscow, so it is impossible to say
precisely when, or by whom, it was decided to move to Tarutino. Only
when the army had got there, as the result of innumerable and varying
forces, did people begin to assure themselves that they