s be a mean--what in mechanics is represented by
the diagonal of a parallelogram of forces.

If in the descriptions given by historians, especially French ones, we
find their wars and battles carried out in accordance with previously
formed plans, the only conclusion to be drawn is that those descriptions
are false.

The battle of Tarutino obviously did not attain the aim Toll had in
view--to lead the troops into action in the order prescribed by the
dispositions; nor that which Count Orlov-Denisov may have had in
view--to take Murat prisoner; nor the result of immediately destroying
the whole corps, which Bennigsen and others may have had in view; nor
the aim of the officer who wished to go into action to distinguish
himself; nor that of the Cossack who wanted more booty than he got, and
so on. But if the aim of the battle was what actually resulted and what
all the Russians of that day desired--to drive the French out of Russia
and destroy their army--it is quite clear that the battle of Tarutino,
just because of its incongruities, was exactly what was wanted at that
stage of the campaign. It would be difficult and even impossible to
imagine any result more opportune than the actual outcome of this
battle. With a minimum of effort and insignificant losses, despite the
greatest confusion, the most important results of the whole campaign
were attained: the transition from retreat to advance, an exposure of
the weakness of the French, and the administration of that shock which
Napoleon's army had only awaited to begin its flight.

CHAPTER VIII

Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there
can be no doubt about the victory for the battlefield remains in the
hands of the French. The Russians retreat and abandon their ancient
capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions, and
incalculable wealth, is in Napoleon's hands. The Russian army, only half
the strength of the French, does not make a single attempt to attack for
a whole month. Napoleon's position is most brilliant. He can either fall
on the Russian army with double its strength and destroy it; negotiate
an advantageous peace, or in case of a refusal make a menacing move on
Petersburg, or even, in the case of a reverse, return to Smolensk or
Vilna; or remain in Moscow; in short, no special genius would seem to be
required to retain the brilliant position the French held at that time.
For that, only very simple and e