plained why our action against Serbia was
regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we
were a great power which was proceeding against the small Serbian
state, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions
in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its
sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or
even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent
toward the future fate of Serbia, which was linked to Russia by
historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the
trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to
accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when
the conditions afterward imposed by us could not yet be known.
But even with reference to these demands they would do everything
they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was
possible.

"I reminded the ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the
fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in
Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we
only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would
offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Serbia. To this I
added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations
with Serbia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how
large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these
circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the
wishes of the responsible authorities.

"I referred to the Russian mobilization which had then come to my
knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of
Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan it had an appearance of hostility
against the [Dual] Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for
this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia.
Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia; against
Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the
single fact that the first, tenth, and eleventh corps had not
been mobilized. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was
openly mobilizing against us, we should have to extend our
mobilization too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly
that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of
hostility toward Russia.