fusal at Foreign Office in Vienna to discuss Sarajevo incident
with foreign representatives, or if subject was mentioned,
assurances that nothing would be done against Serbia to give
uneasiness to the powers, in particular Russia. Foreign ambassadors,
thus assured, quit Vienna on long leaves of absence for watering
places. All this indicates that Austria-Hungary was contemplating
sudden action, which, when a _fait accompli_, would likely be
accepted by the powers in order to avoid a general war.

9. German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the only foreign
representative informed of note to Serbia. He knew its minutest
details, and there is reason to believe he helped draft it.

10. When note was published, French, British, and Russian
representatives at Vienna asked me if it were not better to accept
the demands and avoid war for the present.

"I said that the note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of
war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia
should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary
would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at
any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited
to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted
such a note.

"The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko [then absent from Vienna,]
previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several
occasions to his colleagues and the Austro-Hungarian Government
that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by
Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of
Serbia. Hence the apprehension felt by the French and British
Ambassadors and the Russian Charge d'Affaires, who at once
foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and
Austria-Hungary."

11. Expressed intention of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chastise Serbia by arms without
consent of European concert. Belief expressed by German Ambassador
that Russia would permit this, owing to troubles in Asia, and
assurances given by him that Germany would stand by her ally in the
matter.

"These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to
hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war,
on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before
the latter had completed her military reorganization, _i.e._,