before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been
freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. 'The longer
the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of
success of the Triple Alliance.' On the other hand, rumors from
the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in
Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign
Office] did not approve of Austria's policy on this question,
and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given
to him."

_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
made a statement in the House of Commons as to the diplomatic
situation, particularly of Great Britain. The chief points in it
were:

1. The peace of Europe cannot be preserved, despite Great Britain's
earnest and consistent efforts to that end.

2. Great Britain's good faith in this matter is proved by her
actions in the Balkan crisis, where it was generally admitted she
worked for peace.

3. Parliament is free to decide on attitude of Great Britain.

Here the secretary referred to the Moroccan crisis of 1906, and said
that then he had taken the same attitude with respect to France.

"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they
said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you
think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might,
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the
armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not
be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between
naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to
it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the
distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military
or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any
way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they
would give that support when the time arose.

"As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election
was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that
without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to
be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime
Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of