niversity Life, etc._ (1874), 83-87.

VII. THEORY

What theory corresponds to this practical order? It implies, in the
first place, a constant reference to tradition. The system has grown up
without any reference to abstract principles or symmetrical plan. The
legal order supposes a traditional common law, as the ecclesiastical
order a traditional creed, and the organisation is explicable only by
historical causes. The system represents a series of compromises, not
the elaboration of a theory. If the squire undertook by way of
supererogation to justify his position he appealed to tradition and
experience. He invoked the 'wisdom of our ancestors,' the system of
'checks and balances' which made our Constitution an unrivalled mixture
of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy deserving the 'dread and envy
of the world.' The prescription for compounding that mixture could
obviously be learned by nothing but experiment. Traditional means
empirical. By instinct, rather than conscious reasoning, Englishmen had
felt their way to establishing the 'palladia of our liberties': trial by
jury, the 'Habeas Corpus' Act, and the substitution of a militia for a
standing army. The institutions were cherished because they had been
developed by long struggles and were often cherished when their real
justification had disappeared. The Constitution had not been 'made' but
had 'grown'; or, in other words, the one rule had been the rule of
thumb. That is an excellent rule in its way, and very superior to an
abstract rule which neglects or overrides experience. The 'logic of
facts,' moreover, may be trusted to produce a certain harmony: and
general principles, though not consciously invoked, tacitly govern the
development of institutions worked out under uniform conditions. The
simple reluctance to pay money without getting money's worth might
generate the important principle that representation should go with
taxation, without embodying any theory of a 'social contract' such as
was offered by an afterthought to give a philosophical sanction.
Englishmen, it is said, had bought their liberties step by step, because
at each step they were in a position to bargain with their rulers. What
they had bought they were determined to keep and considered to be their
inalienable property. One result is conspicuous. In England the ruling
classes did not so much consider their privileges to be something
granted by the state, as the power of the state to be s