orations in England. The country-gentleman had little reason
to fear that government would diminish his importance by tampering with
his functions. The justices of the peace were called upon to take a
great and increasing share in the administration of the poor-law. They
were concerned in all manner of financial details; they regulated such
police as existed; they looked after the old laws by which the trades
were still restricted; and, in theory at least, could fix the rate of
wages. Parliament did not override, but only gave the necessary sanction
to their activity. If we looked through the journals of the House of
Commons during the American War, for example, we should get the
impression that the whole business of the legislature was to arrange
administrative details. If a waste was to be enclosed, a canal or a
highroad to be constructed, there was no public department to be
consulted. The gentry of the neighbourhood joined to obtain a private
act of parliament which gave the necessary powers to the persons
interested. No general enclosure act could be passed, though often
suggested. It would imply a central commission, which would only, as was
suggested, give rise to jobbery and take power out of the natural hands.
Parliament was omnipotent; it could regulate the affairs of the empire
or of a parish; alter the most essential laws or act as a court of
justice; settle the crown or arrange for a divorce or for the alteration
of a private estate. But it objected to delegate authority even to a
subordinate body, which might tend to become independent. Thus, if it
was the central power and source of all legal authority, it might also
be regarded as a kind of federal league, representing the wills of a
number of partially independent persons. The gentry could meet there and
obtain the sanction of their allies for any measure required in their
own little sphere of influence. But they had an instinctive aversion to
the formation of any organised body representing the state. The
neighbourhood which wanted a road got powers to make it, and would
concur in giving powers to others. But if the state were to be intrusted
to make roads, ministers would have more places to give, and roads
might be made which they did not want. The English roads had long been
infamous, but neither was money wasted, as in France, on roads where
there was no traffic.[13] Thus we have the combination of an absolute
centralisation of legislative power with