259
The President's Message to Congress, November 5, 1811 259
Increase of the army voted 259
Debate on the navy 260
Congress refuses to increase the navy, January 27, 1812 263
Embargo of ninety days preparatory to war, April 4 263
The evasions of this measure 264
Increasing evidence of the duplicity of Napoleon's action 266
Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1812 269
Consequent British declaration 270
Use of these papers by Barlow, American Minister to France 271
The spurious French Decree of April 28, 1811, communicated to
Barlow 272
Communicated to the British Government 273
Considerations influencing the British Government 274
The Orders in Council revoked 276
Madison sends a war message to Congress, June 1, 1812 279
Declaration of war, June 18, 1812 279
Conditions of the army, navy, and treasury 279
CHAPTER V
THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
Limitations on American action through deficient sea power 283
Warfare against commerce considered 284
Its financial and political effects 285
Its military bearing 285
Distinction between military and commercial blockade 286
Commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying
by cruisers 287
Recognition of this by Napoleon 287
Commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger
navy; by cruisers, of the weaker 288
Inefficiency of the American Government shown in the want of
naval preparation 289
Conditions in the army even worse 290
Jefferson's sanguine expectations 291
Propriety of the invasion of Canada discussed 292
The United States, weak
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