on the seaboard, relatively strong
towards Canada 295
Function of the seaboard in the war; defensive 296
Offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence 298
Application of this principle; in general, and to 1812 298
Conditions on the Canada frontier, favoring the offensive by
the United States 300
Importance of the Great Lakes to military operations 301
Over-confidence of Americans 303
Corresponding apprehension of British officers 304
Decisive points on the line between the countries 305
Importance of the Indians as an element in the situation 306
Proper offensive policy of the United States 307
Natural advantages favoring the United States 309
The land frontier the proper scene of American offensive action 310
Seaboard conditions, for offence and defence 311
CHAPTER VI
EARLY CRUISES AND ENGAGEMENTS. HULL'S OPERATIONS AND SURRENDER
Composition of Commodore Rodgers' squadron at outbreak of war 314
Indecisions of the Navy Department 315
Question between small squadrons and single cruisers for
commerce-destroying 315
Opinions of prominent officers 316
British convoy system for protecting trade 319
The Navy Department formulates a plan of operations 320
Discussion of its merits 321
Rodgers sails without receiving Department's plan 322
Encounter with the "Belvidera" 323
The cruise unproductive, offensively 324
But not therefore unsuccessful, defensively 325
Its effect upon the movements of British vessels 326
The sailing of the "Constitution" 328
Chased by a British squadron 329
Cruise of the "Constitution" under Hull 329
Engagement with the "Guerriere" 330
Hull and Rodgers meet in Boston
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