rican war 383

Need of the American market 384

Danger to British West India trade from an American war 384

Burden thrown upon the British Admiralty 385

British anxiety to avoid war 385

CHAPTER VIII

OCEAN WARFARE AGAINST COMMERCE--PRIVATEERING--BRITISH
LICENSES--NAVAL ACTIONS: "WASP" AND "FROLIC," "UNITED STATES"
AND "MACEDONIAN"

Consolidation of British transatlantic naval commands 387

Sir John Borlase Warren commander-in-chief 387

British merchant ships forbidden to sail without convoy 388

Continued hope for restoration of peace 389

Warren instructed to make propositions 390

Reply of the American Government 391

Cessation of impressment demanded. Negotiation fails 391

Warren's appreciation of the dangers to British commerce 392

Extemporized character of the early American privateering 394

Its activities therefore mainly within Warren's station 394

Cruise of the privateer "Rossie," Captain Barney 395

Privateering not a merely speculative undertaking 396

Conditions necessary to its success 397

Illustrated by the privateer "America" 398

Comparative immunity of American shipping and commerce at the
beginning of hostilities 399

Causes for this 400

Controversial correspondence between Warren and the Admiralty 401

Policy of the Admiralty. Its effects 404

American ships of war and privateers gradually compelled to
cruise in distant seas 406

American commerce excluded from the ocean 406

Sailing of the squadrons of Rodgers and Decatur 407

Their separation 408

Cruise of Rodgers' squadron 409

British licenses to American merchant vessels 410

Action between the "Wasp" and "Frolic" 412

Cruise of the "Argus," of Decatur's d