; for, as in
that case, our loss will generally be equal to the enemy's, this fire
will give us no superiority in the charge, and the loss we have
sustained will be therefore entirely thrown away.

6. Nevertheless, our actual attack should be _prepared_, when possible,
by the infliction of such a loss on the enemy as will make him inferior
to us at the decisive moment. In war, the object is not to test the
comparative courage of the combatants, but to beat the enemy. We must
never, therefore, when it can be avoided, fight him on equal terms; and
so, never close with him without such a superiority in numbers,
position, or spirit, as will make the chances decidedly in our favor.
If, without exposing ourselves to much loss, we can inflict a
considerable loss upon him, we shall render him inferior to us, both by
the number of his men we have disabled, and by the demoralization
thereby caused in his ranks.

7. This preparatory loss can be most effectually inflicted by the _fire
of artillery_; as, from its great superiority of range, it can suffer
but little, meanwhile, from the enemy's infantry fire. Our attacking
infantry are thus enabled to keep out of the range of the fire of the
infantry they are to attack, till the moment of advancing to close.

8. When we have no artillery disposable for the purpose, the preparatory
effect may be produced by a _well-sustained fire of infantry_, provided
it can find a sheltered position to deliver it from; or, by the fire of
a heavy line of skirmishers.

9. If we can make the infantry we wish to attack _engage in a prolonged
fire_, this will exhaust them, and thus render them inferior to us in
strength and in spirit, even if we inflict on them but little loss. But
as our attacking infantry should, in the mean time, be kept fresh, the
preparatory fire, in such case, should not devolve on the troops that
are to close with the enemy.

10. One cause of the _indecisiveness of the results_ obtained in many of
the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on
both sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often kept
firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss,
until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making
a vigorous and decisive charge. Or else, charges were made on the
enemy's battalions before they had been shattered by artillery; so that
the attacking troops were easily repulsed, sometimes with great