vision with the bayonet. The French did not wait for them to
close, but rushed on with the bayonet themselves, and completely routed
them.

10. A volley concentrated upon the enemy's _regimental colors_ will
usually disable the color-guard and the men near it; and, if promptly
followed up by a charge, may enable us to capture the colors. This is
always an important advantage; for, by the loss of its colors, a
regiment is not only dispirited, but in danger of disorganization;
these being its proper rallying-point.

11. When infantry is acting as a _support to artillery_ which is
attacked, it should throw out sharpshooters to reply to the enemy's
skirmishers that are firing at the gunners and horses, whilst it engages
the compact mass by which it is itself attacked.

If the enemy should commit the blunder of attacking the battery with his
entire force, without detaching to engage the support, we should profit
by it by instantly charging him in flank; but taking care not to be led
away to any distance from the battery we are protecting.

12. Infantry, surrounded by the enemy, will often be able to _cut its
way through_ and escape. For this purpose, as the highest degree of
concentration is required, its formation should be in close column.

VI.--Defence against Artillery.

1. The best defence of infantry against artillery is by the fire of
_sharpshooters_ deployed as skirmishers, to pick off the gunners and the
horses; the main body, meanwhile, occupying the most sheltered locality
it can find.

2. Where no shelter is afforded by any natural obstacles, or by
irregularities of ground, it may be sometimes necessary to make the men
_lie down_.

But this expedient should be used as rarely as possible, on account of
its demoralizing tendency. Troops that have become accustomed to it
cannot be expected to bravely face the enemy; and the habit is very
rapidly formed. At Bull Run, in July, 1861, a whole company was seen to
grovel in the dust at the mere snapping of a percussion-cap of one of
their own muskets.

This demoralizing tendency does not exist, however, where troops lie
down only to enable their own artillery to fire over them. This was
shown at the battle of Pea Ridge, where several of our regiments lay on
the ground for two hours or more, while thirty of our guns were firing
over them. When, at last, this fire had silenced the enemy's guns, our
infantry then rose, charged him in a compact line, and drove hi