oratory, 'the tribune of Athens would have
been the disgrace of mankind if Phocion and men like him, by
occasionally ascending it before drinking the hemlock or setting out for
their place of exile, had not in some sort balanced such a mass of
loquacity, extravagance, and cruelty.'[13]

It is very important to remember this constant solicitude for ideas that
should work well, in connection with that book of De Maistre's which
has had most influence in Europe, by supplying a base for the theories
of ultramontanism. Unless we perceive very clearly that throughout his
ardent speculations on the Papal power his mind was bent upon enforcing
the practical solution of a pressing social problem, we easily
misunderstand him and underrate what he had to say. A charge has been
forcibly urged against him by an eminent English critic, for example,
that he has confounded supremacy with infallibility, than which, as the
writer truly says, no two ideas can be more perfectly distinct, one
being superiority of force, and the other incapacity of error.[14] De
Maistre made logical blunders in abundance quite as bad as this, but he
was too acute, I think, deliberately to erect so elaborate a structure
upon a confusion so very obvious, and that must have stared him in the
face from the first page of his work to the last. If we look upon his
book as a mere general defence of the Papacy, designed to investigate
and fortify all its pretensions one by one, we should have great right
to complain against having two claims so essentially divergent, treated
as though they were the same thing, or could be held in their places by
the same supports. But let us regard the treatise on the Pope not as
meant to convince free-thinkers or Protestants that divine grace
inspires every decree of the Holy Father, though that would have been
the right view of it if it had been written fifty years earlier. It was
composed within the first twenty years of the present century, when the
universe, to men of De Maistre's stamp, seemed once more without form
and void. His object, as he tells us more than once, was to find a way
of restoring a religion and a morality in Europe; of giving to truth the
forces demanded for the conquests that she was meditating; of
strengthening the thrones of sovereigns, and of gently calming that
general fermentation of spirit which threatened mightier evils than any
that had yet overwhelmed society. From this point of view we shall see
t