hat the distinction between supremacy and infallibility was not worth
recognising.
Practically, he says, 'infallibility is only a consequence of supremacy,
or rather it is absolutely the same thing under two different names....
In effect it is the same thing, _in practice_, not to be subject to
error, and not to be liable to be accused of it. Thus, even if we should
agree that no divine promise was made to the Pope, he would not be less
infallible or deemed so, as the final tribunal; for every judgment from
which you cannot appeal is and must be (_est et doit etre_) held for
just in every human association, under any imaginable form of
government; and every true statesman will understand me perfectly, when
I say that the point is to ascertain not only if the Sovereign Pontiff
is, but if he must be, infallible.'[15] In another place he says
distinctly enough that the infallibility of the Church has two aspects;
in one of them it is the object of divine promise, in the other it is a
human implication, and that in the latter aspect infallibility is
supposed in the Church, just 'as we are absolutely bound to suppose it,
even in temporal sovereignties (where it does not really exist), under
pain of seeing society dissolved.' The Church only demands what other
sovereignties demand, though she has the immense superiority over them
of having her claim backed by direct promise from heaven.[16] Take away
the dogma, if you will, he says, and only consider the thing
politically, which is exactly what he really does all through the book.
The pope, from this point of view, asks for no other infallibility than
that which is attributed to all sovereigns.[17] Without either
vindicating or surrendering the supernatural side of the Papal claims,
he only insists upon the political, social, or human side of it, as an
inseparable quality of an admitted supremacy.[18] In short, from
beginning to end of this speculation, from which the best kind of
ultramontanism has drawn its defence, he evinces a deprecatory
anxiety--a very rare temper with De Maistre--not to fight on the issue
of the dogma of infallibility over which Protestants and unbelievers
have won an infinite number of cheap victories; that he leaves as a
theme more fitted for the disputations of theologians. My position, he
seems to keep saying, is that if the Pope is spiritually supreme, then
he is virtually and practically _as if he were_ infallible, just in the
same sense in whic
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