s the peculiar foggy air of Lancashire is essential to the weaving
of the finer sorts of tissues, so an atmosphere of misunderstandings
would really seem to suit the War Office.
In the cable telling me I would have 205,000 troops for my push, the S.
of S. had informed me categorically that the 8,500 Yeomanry and mounted
troops in Egypt, as well as 11,500 Indian troops and the Artillery
stationed there _were mine_.
As the present garrison of Egypt numbers over 70,000 and as the old
peace garrison of Egypt was 5,000 and as, further, there is no question
of serious attack on Egypt from outside, it seemed to us there might be
men in this part of the message. Leaving the Indian troops out of the
account, for the moment, I therefore wired to Maxwell and asked him if
he thought he would be able to organize a _portion_ of the 8,500 mounted
men, in order that, at a pinch, they might be able to come and reinforce
us here. So the matter stood when I got another cable from the S. of S.
telling me 5,000 drafts are "_en route_ or under orders" to join the
29th Division and that the War Office are "unable to carry out your
views about additional marginal drafts." S. of S. then goes on:--
* * * * *
"Maxwell wires that you are taking 300 officers and 5,000 men of his
mounted troops. I do not quite understand why you require Egyptian
Garrison troops while you have the LIIIrd Division at Alexandria, and
the LIVth, the last six battalions of which are arriving in five or six
days, on the _Aquitania_.
"When I placed the Egyptian Garrison at your disposal to reinforce at
the Dardanelles in case of necessity, Maxwell pointed out that Egypt
would be left very short, and I replied that you would only require them
in case of emergency for a short time, and that the risk must be run. I
did not contemplate, however, that you would take troops from the
Egyptian Garrison until those sent specially for you were exhausted. How
long will you require Maxwell's troops, and where do you intend to send
them? They should only be removed from Egypt for actual operations and
for the shortest possible time."
We may read this cable wrong but it seems to us to embody a topsy-turvy
tactic! To wait till one part of your forces are killed off (for that is
the plain English of "exhausted") before you bring up the other part of
your forces.
It is not easy to know what to do. The very best we can do, it sometimes
seems to
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