ms to be a
moment when success is in the assailant's grasp. Both the French
and ourselves at Arras and Neuve Chapelle lost the opportunity."

Well said! K. has made Stopford bring me in his pocket the very text for
what I wanted to say to him. Only my grumbling thoughts find expression
by my pen but I have plenty of others and my heart has its warm corner
for K. whenever he cares to come in.

As I told Stopford, K. has not only anticipated my advice but has dived
right down into this muddle of twentieth century war and finds lying at
the bottom of it only the old original idea of war in the year 1. At our
first landing the way was open to us for just so long as the _surprise_
to the Turks lasted. That period here, at the Dardanelles, might be
taken as being perhaps twice as long as it would be on the Western front
which gave us a great pull. The reason was that land communications were
bad and our troops on the sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on
their one or two bad roads. Yet, even so, there was no margin for
dawdling. Hunter-Weston and d'Amade had tried their best to use their
brief _surprise_ breathing space in seizing the Key to the opening of
the Narrows--Achi Baba, and had failed through lack of small craft, lack
of water, lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our 10 per
cent. reserves to fill casualties. At that crucial moment when we had
beaten the local enemy troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet
come up, we could not get the men or the stuff quick enough to shore.
Still, we had gained three or four miles and there were spots on the
Peninsula where, to-day, three or four miles would be enough. Also,
supposing he had to run a landing, his (Stopford's) action would take
place under much easier conditions than Hunter-Weston's on April 25th.

First and foremost, in our "beetles" or barges, conveying 500 men under
their own engines, we had an instrument which reduced the physical
effort three quarters. This meant half the battle. When we made our
original landing at Anzac we could only put 1,500 men ashore, per trip,
at a speed of 2-1/2 miles per hour, in open cutters. Were a Commander to
repeat that landing now, he would be able to run 5,000 men ashore, per
trip, at a speed of five miles per hour with no trouble about oars,
tows, etc., and with protection against shrapnel and rifle bullets. As
to the actual landing on the beach, that could be done--we had proved
it--in less