portance to
sea-officers of the present day when compared with the instructive
fact that so long a time elapsed between the appearance of the large
sailing-ship, with its broadside battery, and the systematic adoption
of the order which was best adapted to develop the full power of the
fleet for mutual support. To us, having the elements of the problem in
our hands, together with the result finally reached, that result seems
simple enough, almost self-evident. Why did it take so long for the
capable men of that day to reach it? The reason--and herein lies the
lesson for the officer of to-day--was doubtless the same that leaves
the order of battle so uncertain now; namely, that the necessity of
war did not force men to make up their minds, until the Dutch at last
met in the English their equals on the sea. The sequence of ideas
which resulted in the line-of-battle is clear and logical. Though
familiar enough to seamen, it will be here stated in the words of the
writer last quoted, because they have a neatness and precision
entirely French:--

"With the increase of power of the ship-of-war, and with the
perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an
equal progress in the art of utilizing them.... As naval
evolutions become more skilful, their importance grows from day
to day. To these evolutions there is needed a base, a point from
which they depart and to which they return. A fleet of war-ships
must be always ready to meet an enemy; logically, therefore,
this point of departure for naval evolutions must be the order
of battle. Now, since the disappearance of galleys, almost all
the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of war. Hence
it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned toward
the enemy. On the other hand, it is necessary that the sight of
the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. Only
one formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy
fully these conditions. That formation is the line ahead
[column]. This line, therefore, is imposed as the only order of
battle, and consequently as the basis of all fleet tactics. In
order that this order of battle, this long thin line of guns,
may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the rest,
there is at the same time felt the necessity of putting in it
only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally
stro