nder Brigadier General Nicholson, consisting of the 75th
Regiment, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, and Punjab Infantry, to storm the breach
at the Kashmir bastion--in all 1,000 men.

No. 2 Column, under Brigadier W. Jones (H.M. 61st Regiment), consisting
of H.M. 8th (the King's) Regiment, 2nd Europeans, 4th Sikhs--altogether
850 men to storm the breach near the Water bastion.

No. 3, under Colonel Campbell, consisting of the 52nd Regiment, the
Kumaon battalion of Goorkhas, and 1st Punjab Infantry--in all 950
men--to assault the Kashmir Gate after it should be blown in by the
Engineers.

No. 5, or the Reserve, under Brigadier Longfield (H.M. 8th Regiment), to
follow No. 3 by that gate into the city, was composed of the 61st, the
Belooch battalion, 4th Punjab Infantry, and the Jhind troops--altogether
1,300 men, with 200 of H.M. 60th Rifles--to cover the advance of
Nicholson's column and to form a reserve.

The whole of the above-named columns were under the immediate command of
General Nicholson, on whom devolved all arrangements for carrying out
the assault on Delhi.

No. 4 Column, under Major Reid, the officer in command at Hindoo Rao's
house, was formed of part of the 60th Rifles, the Sirmoor battalion
of Goorkhas, detachments from European regiments, and the Kashmir
contingent. This column was to attack the fortified suburb of
Kishenganj, and enter the city by the Lahore Gate, meeting Nos. 1 and 2
Columns at that place.

The cavalry brigade, under Colonel Grant, composed of the 9th Lancers,
part of the 6th Carabineers, with Sikh and Punjab cavalry and some
Horse Artillery, took up their position on the right of No. 1 Advanced
Battery, facing the Mori Gate, and within range of Kishenganj. Their
object was to oppose any attempt to take the storming columns in
flank, to watch the movements of the enemy, and to guard the camp from
surprise.

To the convalescents and a small force of cavalry and artillery the
protection of the camp was confided--a very insufficient guard when it
is considered that the enemy might well, out of their vast numbers, have
detached part of their horsemen and infantry to harass, if not imperil,
its safety, and that of the many, sick and wounded. As will hereafter be
seen, great danger resulted from the arrangements made in this respect;
and had the enemy, after our unsuccessful attack on Kishenganj on the
14th, but shown a spirit of pluck and daring, it is not too much to
affirm that the camp mig