our troops. The Kishenganj battery also opened fire, and our position
became critical in the extreme from the increasing number of the foe,
who were constantly reinforced, and defied all endeavours to drive them
from their cover.

While the struggle was thus raging on the left, the Kashmir troops on
the extreme right flank had become involved with a large force of the
enemy of all arms, who, no doubt despising the martial qualities of
these half-disciplined levies, attacked them on all sides with
great vigour. Our allies made no stand, and soon became completely
disorganized, flying at length in headlong rout, with the loss of all
their guns. No record was kept of their casualties, but they must have
been very severe. For the future they remained unemployed in their camp,
bewailing the loss of their four guns, and were never again engaged with
the enemy.

Two or three days after the capture of Delhi I was wandering, with some
others, through the streets of the city, when we came upon an officer
and four men of the contingent, who accosted us, asking if we had heard
or seen anything of their lost guns. They seemed in great grief, fearing
the wrath of the Maharajah of Kashmir when they should arrive home,
leaving the guns behind. With difficulty restraining a laugh, we assured
them that we could give no information on the subject, and counselled
them to search among the guns on the bastions near the Lahore and Ajmir
Gates. They succeeded eventually in finding two, the others probably
being borne off as trophies by the sepoys during the evacuation of
Delhi. The contingent soon afterwards left for Kashmir, but how they
were received by the Maharajah we never heard, though probably condign
punishment was meted out to those who had actual charge of the guns.

The defeat of the Kashmir troops had a most disastrous effect on the
issue of the attack on Kishenganj. Reinforced in great numbers, as I
have related, the enemy maintained their ground, and our men could make
no impression on them, chiefly from the want of field-guns. Major Reid,
moreover, was wounded at an early stage of the action, and was carried
off the field. His absence was soon felt in the altered dispositions of
the force, and the want of a leader to carry out the plans formed by
him.

The breastworks which had been taken could not be held for want of
support, and some confusion resulted, the enemy's artillery from
Kishenganj and musketry from the gardens ca