which this power was conferred.--Feudal
seignior, and suzerain, that is to say, commander-in-chief of the great
resident army whose willing forces had served to reconstruct society in
the ninth century, the King, through the remotest of his origins--that
is to say, through the immemorial confusion of sovereignty with
property--was the owner of France, the same as an individual owns his
private domain.[2310]--Married, moreover, to the Church since the first
Capets, consecrated and crowned at Rheims, anointed by God like a second
David,[2311] not only was he believed to be authorized from on high,
like other monarchs, but, from Louis le Gros, and especially after the
time of saint Louis, he appeared as the delegate from on high, invested
with a laic sacerdotalism, clothed with moral power, minister of eternal
justice, redresser of wrongs, protector of the weak, benefactor of the
humble--in short, "His Most Christian Majesty."--At length, after the
thirteenth century, the recent discovery and diligent study of the
ancient codes of Justinian had shown in his person the successor of
the Caesars of Rome and of the Emperors of Constantinople. According
to these codes the people in a body had transferred its rights to the
prince; now, in antique cities, all rights were vested in the community,
and the individual had none;[2312] accordingly, through this transfer,
all rights, public or private, passed into the hands of the prince;
henceforth he could exercise them as he pleased, under no restriction
and no control. He was above the law, since he made it; his powers were
illimitable and his decision absolute.[2313]
On this triple frame the jurists, like State spiders, had, from Philippe
le Bel down, spun their web, and the instinctive concordance of their
hereditary efforts had attached all its threads to the omnipotence of
the King.--Being jurisconsults--that is to say, logicians--they were
obliged to deduce, and their minds naturally recurred to the unique
and rigid principle to which they might attach their arguments.--As
advocates and councilors of the crown they espoused the case of their
client and, through professional zeal, derived or forced precedents and
texts to his advantage.--By virtue of being administrators and judges
the grandeur of their master constituted their grandeur, and personal
interest counseled them to expand a prerogative in which, through
delegation, they took part.--Hence, during four centuries, they
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